Elite and popular religiosity among Dutch-Turkish Muslims
How do highly religious Dutch-Turkish Muslims experience their faith, and does the form of their religiosity matter for how they see other religions, women, other ethnic groups and their own community? A survey of more than a thousand respondents, with the key findings in numbers.
Background: the Great Bear, with its stars plotted as red points, from al-Sufi’s Book of Fixed Stars. Bodleian Library, MS Marsh 144. Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons.
- Design
- Mixed methods: participant observation and literature study, followed by a questionnaire survey
- Data collection
- Paper questionnaires at mosques, Islamic centres, schools and secular venues in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague, plus an online survey (November 2012 – April 2013)
- Sample
- 1,165 Dutch-Turkish Muslims; 893 with high religiosity; 748 classified as consistently elite or popular
- Measures
- General Religiosity Scale (25 items, α = .94), Elite Religiosity Scale (11 items, α = .82), Popular Religiosity Scale (11 items, α = .84), and consequential-dimension scales (23 items). Five-point scales (1 = completely disagree, 5 = completely agree)
Two orientations, four dimensions
The Elite and Popular Religiosity Scales measure what motivates a believer in four dimensions of religiosity. Each cell names the motivation, explains it briefly and gives one item from the questionnaire. Respondents rated items from 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree).
Self-awareness and openness to change
Beliefs are verified (taḥqīq) through questioning and doubt; the believer as ‘investigator’ (muḥaqqiq).
“I think that there are many more things in my faith that I have not perceived yet.”
Spiritual stability
Beliefs rest on imitation (taqlīd) and trust in tradition, and stay stable over time; the believer as ‘imitator’ (muqallid).
“My religious beliefs are pretty much the same today as they were five years ago.”
Meaning of private ritual
Worship valued for its inner quality and meaning, not for a reward in return.
“When I pray, I mostly try to understand the meanings of chapters and prayers.”
Material expectations; impressive public ritual
Worship valued for its quantity and its benefits, such as relief, protection or a peaceful life; the collective rite is what stays in memory.
“I perform my prayers to God to gain relief and protection.”
Keeping experience private; not seeking it
Mystical or miraculous experiences are not sought, and are kept to oneself (ḥifẓ al-sirr).
“If I experience the presence of the Divine (i.e., guidance of God or the Prophet), I prefer to keep it to myself.”
Importance of miracles; sharing experience
Miracles and special divine gifts are seen as essential, and are readily shared with family and friends.
“It is essential for religious spiritual leaders to have miracles (karamats).”
No certainty of current knowledge
Knowledge of both outward (ẓāhir) and inward (bāṭin) meanings, held open to revision.
“There are many religious issues on which my views are still changing.”
Certainty and intellectual stability
Outward, quickly found answers, accepted without doubt when they come from an authority.
“If I find answers to my religious questions through Imams, I never doubt their correctness.”
The fifth dimension in the model, the consequences of religiosity for everyday life, is treated as an outcome and measured separately through the attitude scales in Figure 2. Scale items and subcomponents: thesis appendix, Tables 37–38.
Who is elite, who is popular?
Among highly religious respondents, popular religiosity is by far the most common form.
Show data table
| Group | n | % |
|---|---|---|
| Highly religious | 893 | 76.7 |
| Low religiosity | 272 | 23.3 |
| Popular religiosity | 545 | 61.0 |
| Elite religiosity | 203 | 22.7 |
| Both scales | 66 | 7.4 |
| Neither scale | 79 | 8.8 |
Religiosity and attitudes towards others
Mean agreement with each attitude scale (1–5). Lower scores mean less hostility, prejudice or conservatism. Hover over a mark for details.
On five of six scales, respondents with elite religiosity score lower (less hostile, less prejudiced, less conservative) than those with popular religiosity. On attitudes towards modernity there is no difference. The attitudes-towards-women scale covers male respondents only.
Show data table
| Scale | Elite mean (SD, n) | Popular mean (SD, n) | Difference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hostile attitudes towards other religions | 1.90 (0.73, 203) | 2.34 (0.90, 545) | p < .001 |
| Subordinate attitudes towards women (men only) | 1.66 (0.59, 123) | 2.13 (0.73, 281) | p < .001 |
| Prejudiced attitudes towards race | 1.82 (0.74, 203) | 2.20 (0.91, 545) | p < .001 |
| Hostile attitudes towards others | 1.78 (0.65, 203) | 2.15 (0.81, 545) | p < .001 |
| Conservative in-group attitudes | 2.52 (0.97, 168) | 2.99 (0.94, 393) | p < .001 |
| Harmonious attitudes towards modernity | 2.17 (0.96, 203) | 2.18 (1.01, 545) | n.s. |
Where does religiosity come from?
Correlation between each form of religiosity and the sources respondents said influenced their religious life.
Elite religiosity goes with books and family, and away from television. Popular religiosity goes with religious leaders, mosques, television and the internet.
Show data table
| Source | Elite r | Popular r |
|---|---|---|
| Family | 0.184** | 0.074 |
| Friends | 0.086 | 0.079 |
| School | 0.129 | 0.010 |
| Books | 0.266** | -0.005 |
| Religious leaders | 0.141* | 0.177** |
| Mosques | -0.018 | 0.174** |
| Religious foundations | 0.041 | 0.057 |
| Television | -0.221** | 0.187** |
| Internet | 0.038 | 0.104* |
* p < .05 · ** p < .01 (two-tailed). Elite n = 203, popular n = 545.
Religious foundations and movements
Membership (official or voluntary) reported by all respondents, n = 1,165. The question was optional.
One in five respondents is linked to the Turkish Diyanet Foundation; almost a third report no membership at all.
Show data table
| Membership | n | % |
|---|---|---|
| Diyanet (Turkish Diyanet Foundation) | 238 | 20.4 |
| Nur movement | 129 | 11.1 |
| Milli Görüş | 115 | 9.9 |
| Other community or movement | 96 | 8.2 |
| Süleymancı community | 42 | 3.6 |
| None | 370 | 31.8 |
| No answer | 175 | 15.0 |
Popular religiosity rises with age
Mean popular religiosity score by age group.
Differences between age groups are significant (F = 3.39, p = .003). First-generation respondents also score higher than the second generation (3.86 vs 3.69, p < .001).
Show data table
| Age | Mean popular religiosity | n |
|---|---|---|
| 18–25 | 3.72 | 159 |
| 26–35 | 3.77 | 144 |
| 36–45 | 3.80 | 108 |
| 46–55 | 3.92 | 80 |
| 56+ | 3.91 | 54 |
Education pulls in opposite directions
Mean scores by highest level of education.
Higher education goes with more elite religiosity (F = 2.83, p = .039) and less popular religiosity (F = 10.83, p < .001). Gender makes no significant difference to either form.
Show data table
| Education | Elite mean (n) | Popular mean (n) |
|---|---|---|
| Primary | 3.41 (11) | 3.91 (79) |
| Secondary | 3.63 (31) | 3.92 (153) |
| Undergraduate | 3.69 (111) | 3.72 (267) |
| Postgraduate | 3.69 (50) | 3.66 (46) |
- High religiosity among Dutch-Turkish Muslims takes different forms and rests on different motivations.
- Six out of ten highly religious respondents experience popular religiosity; about two out of ten experience elite religiosity.
- Respondents with elite religiosity are more open towards other religions and express less racial or ethnic prejudice.
- Men with elite religiosity hold stronger views on the equality and rights of women than men with popular religiosity.
- Popular religiosity is stronger among older, first-generation and less educated respondents.
The survey did not measure Salafism, radicalism or support for violence, so the figures on this page say nothing directly about them. In the thesis, the findings are read within a wider interpretive frame. Popular religiosity, with its fragmentary and pragmatic character, can reduce the reflexivity, autonomy and openness that characterise elite religiosity. In a European climate of perceived existential threat, the thesis argues, such religiosity may become more receptive to rigid and fundamentalist readings of Islam, including new Salafi interpretations. These are interpretations and questions for further research, not measured results.
Source Gürlesin, Ö. F. (2018). Elite and Popular Religiosity among Dutch-Turkish Muslims in the Netherlands [PhD thesis, Leiden University], chapters 4–5. Open access: hdl.handle.net/1887/67237